a. In local war: To bring the conflict to a conclusion satisfactory to the U, S,, in a manner which protects U, S, Allies and preserves U. S. alliances, which deters further attempts by hostile nations to enhance their influence and strength by armed force, and which minimizes Control of the Sugar Street Sugar Street the risk of escalation to major nuclear war.

b. In central war:

- 1. To preclude, under all circumstances, U. S. military inferiority to an opponent or any potential enemies during or after
- 2. To this end to reduce the military capabilities of the opponent and to retain major strategic capabilities, ready, effective and
- 3. To limit damage to the U. S. and its Allies, at a and the state of the state of the state of minimum to a level consistent with national survival and independence,
- 4. Consistent with above objectives, to achieve decisive military superiority to the opponent.
- 5. To bring the war to a conclusion on the most advantageous terms possible,

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^{1.} Central War is defined as a war between the U, 5, and the USSR in which either nation deliberately attacks the homeland of the other. Local War is defined as any other armed conflict in which significant elements of military forces are engaged.

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POLICY FOR CENTRAL WAR POSTURE AND STRATEGY

Goals

The primary objectives of U, S, policy with respect to central war must be to deter deliberate attack and prevent unintended outbreak. The U, S, rejects armed aggression as a means of enhancing its security; nor can major termonuclear war be its preferred instrument in meeting armed aggression by others. It is an object of U, S, policy that there be adequate alternatives to the initiation by the U, S, of central war. Yet if central war is forced upon the United States, U, S, military strength must still serve multiple national objectives.

Central war can result from a variety of causes other than the calculated and objective view of enemy leaders that they can achieve decisive superiority over the U. S. by deliberate surprise attack. National planning cannot safely be based on the assumption that deterrence will certainly succeed, that unpremeditated nuclear attacks cannot occur, or that major aggression, undeterred, will never challenge the U. S. to fulfill its commitments to Allies and to protect its security by risking or waging central war. Neither can it regard all possible outcomes of a central war as indistinguishable. In some circumstances, even the best outcome attainable in central war may represent unprecedented catastrophe; yet outcomes very significantly worse than the best, both in civil and military aspects, may also be

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possible, and it will remain an urgent goal of U. S. security policy to forestall them,

Thus, central war posture and strategy must continuously be tested not only for ability to prevent deliberate or undeliberated attack but for ability to secure basic national objectives in wartime. Solutions to these separate problems can and should be chosen to reinforce each other.

The most urgent military goal in central war is to preclude the prospect of an unarmed U. S. confronting armed opponents. It is essential that no enemy be able to disarm the U. S. by surprise attack on forces or controls; it is equally important that the U, S, not disarm itself, by expending all ready forces in initial attacks that cannot guarantee to disarm the opponent. Although the Soviet Union must be left in no doubt that its military strength would be drastically reduced in any central war, there may be future circumstances in which U, S, countermilitary action alone could not disarm it totally in initial attack; the Soviets might be able to retain sizeable forces that were initially untargetable or that could be destroyed only at a highly unfavorable rate of exchange in terms of residual capability. To the extent that conservative planning must allow for the survival of such Soviet forces, U. S. posture and strategy must permit the retention of ready uncommitted forces in reserve, at least comparable to estimated Soviet residual forces in ability to inflict further damage or to influence further the military balance. These forces must remain, under all circumstances of enemy attack, under effective control by authorized political leadership,

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A visible and indisputable capability to achieve this basic military requirement is vital to deter deliberate attack on the U. S. It denies such attack any incentive. It guarantees that even a well-designed surprise attack would be futile and costly; an assualt could neither win military superiority nor reduce to acceptable proportions the nuclear retaliation that could be launched by U. S. forces.

At the same time, the capabilities required for this fundamental task serve the other wartime goals of minimizing damage to the U. S. and its

Allies and forcing a conclusion to the war on advantageous terms. U. S. countermilitary action reduces enemy capability to inflict further damage or to continue the war, the survival of sizeable U. S. ready residual forces, threatening, by their very existence, enemy targets surviving or deliberately left unhit in initial attacks, can destroy the will of surviving enemy leaders to pursue unrestricted attacks or to continue the war.

The latter ability to influence enemy will might be particularly vital in circumstances when attacks upon enemy capabilities alone could not deprive enemy forces of a residual ability to inflict grave damage. Under those same circumstances, it might appear probable that attacks against high governmental and military command centers, or indiscriminate initial attacks on all major urban-industrial centers would fail to inhibit punitive retaliation by surviving enemy units, but would instead eliminate the possibility that enemy response could be controlled or terminated to U. S. C.

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
in some degree, into the wartime period, can have important effect not only upon the later stages of hostilities but upon the damage deliberately inflicted by the enemy in his initial assault. Whether the enemy attack were premeditated, irrational, or based on false alarm, initial enemy tactics will reflect his preattack planning, which in turn reflects his image of U, S, capabilities and options. The prospect of confronting sizeable, protected and controlled U, S, reserve forces after any attack should deter him from planning unrestricted attacks on U, S, or Allied society, under any circumstances; it should further induce him to undertake preparations for post-attack flexibility, control, and information. It thus lays the groundwork, if war should occur, for deterring unrestricted enemy attacks and for deterring continuance of hostilities.

Not all objectives can be achieved with equal confidence. But a capability to preclude, with high confidence, enemy residual military superiority at any stage of the conflict offers best hope not only of deterring deliberate attack but, if war occurs, of minimizing damage to the U. S. and its Allies and of stopping the war on the most advantageous terms possible.

At the same time, the posture and strategy for deterring or waging central war must be consistent with efforts to minimize the likelihood of accidents, unauthorized actions or unintended nuclear exchanges, to reduce the spread of nuclear weapons, to deter or defeat local aggression, and to enhance U. S. security by safeguarded arms control agreements

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and by non-military means.

Contingencies

Posture and strategy for central war must be designed to achieve these various U, S, security objectives under a spectrum of contingencies.

It must be intended to deter not only a conservative decision-maker in the absence of national or international tension, but a wishful or frightened opponent in a time of crisis, when his alternatives to attack upon the U, S, might also seem dangerous. Its ability to deter must be able to withstand sizeable enemy miscalculation of U, S, intentions or capabilities, and